Reliable quantitative risk assessment requires the use of meaningful statistical data and well validated models for their interpretation. In certain domains neither the data nor the validated models are available. Nevertheless, there may still be a requirement to generate a meaningful characterisation of risk, presented in a form which reflects the reliability and accuracy of the data available. One such domain is the assessment of the potential carcinogenic risk in chemical compounds, and there are many others. Work is described which is underway to provide a sound framework for the qualitative assessment of risk using a computer model of "argumentation". This work is being applied to the development of computer-based support for the assessment of carcinogenic risk.
Introduction
This paper describes work which is under way to develop sound qualitative methods for risk assessment. A specific focus of this work is the development of a computer-based assistant for the assessment of the potential carcinogenic risk of chemical compounds. However, the approach should have much wider application.
For certain technologies, such as electronic systems, civil engineering structures and mechanical systems, established statistical models are available for making precise and reliable estimates of the likelihood of system failure. Significant quantities of historical data on the failure rates of standard components may be available, for example, or it may be possible to generate reliable simulations of system behaviour. In other areas, however, the position is less satisfactory. For example, in the assessment of the risk associated with compounds used in foods and in agriculture, knowledge of the nature and biological action of complex chemicals may be so sparse that there is considerable doubt about the validity of quantitative models as the basis for formulation of policy. The report of the Department of Health's Committee on Carcinogenicity of Chemicals in Food (Carter, 1992) concludes:
The committee does not support the routine use of quantitative risk assessment for chemical carcinogens. This is because the present models are not validated, are often based on incomplete or inappropriate data, are derived more from mathematical assumptions than from a knowledge of biological mechanisms and, at least at present, demonstrate a disturbingly wide variation in risk estimates depending on the model adopted.
This conclusion echoes the feelings of professionals, managers and policy makers in many other fields. The assumptions needed to apply statistical and other quantitative methods are often held to be simplistic, and the precision they offer illusory.
The work reported here builds on the development of a computational model for reasoning under uncertainty based on the analysis and appraisal of arguments (Krause et al., 1994) . This work has enabled the definition of a set of linguistic uncertainty terms based on a simple logical analysis of the arguments for and against the propositions of interest (Elvang-Gøransson, Krause and Fox, 1993) . This is one of a number of possible approaches to the definition of linguistic terms. Four different approaches will be discussed.
The next section expands on some of the difficulties that may arise with quantitative risk assessments in the domain of chemical toxicity. Following that, Section 3 discusses four approaches that have been taken in defining qualitative terms for the assessment of uncertainty or risk. Section 4 introduces a computational model of argumentation and outlines how it may be used to implement a form of risk assessment using one of the sets of terms described. Having described this model of argumentation, and the definition of linguistic uncertainty terms, the application of this work to the development of a computer-based carcinogenicity risk adviser will be discussed. This work is currently at a very preliminary stage. However, Section 5 contains examples from a "demonstration of concept" prototype with an information-rich reporting facility, incorporating a non-numerical uncertainty assessment with a well defined semantics. Figure 1 provides a very simple example, drawn from the wider domain of toxicological risk assessment, of the sort of reporting facility it is hoped to provide.
An example from Toxicity Assessment.
In order to reinforce the earlier comments about the doubtful validity of numerical approaches to toxicological risk assessment for chemicals, this section presents a short illustration of some of the difficulties. The example is based on guidelines which were issued by the U.S. EPA (Environmental Protection Agency), (U.S. EPA, 1989; Asante-Duah, 1993).
One often used quantification of the toxicological effect of a chemical is the Reference Dose (RfD). A Reference Dose 1 is defined as the maximum amount of a chemical that a human body can absorb without experiencing chronic health effects. It is derived from data obtained from experimental results or long term studies using the chemical of interest. Basically, some experimentally evaluated dose such as the NOAEL (No Observable Adverse Effect Level; the highest level at which a chemical causes no observable adverse effect on the species being tested) is modified using Uncertainty Factors (UF) and a Modifying Factor (MF), which reflect the reliability of the original data:
The recommended uncertainty factors are perhaps better referred to as safety factors, as they result in increasingly cautious estimates of RfD as the uncertainties inherent in the estimation increase. Standard UFs recommended by the EPA include:
• a factor of 10 for variation in sensitivity among members of the human population, reflecting the uncertainties inherent in extrapolating from small sample populations to individuals from a wider population;
• a factor of 10 when extrapolating from results of long-term studies on experimental animals in the absence of adequate human exposure data, reflecting the uncertainties inherent in 1 . Or the similarly derived Acceptable Daily Intake (ADI).
HumanDose RfD
It is confirmed that this substance will be lachrymatory because:
it is chloroacetone which is known to be lachrymatory.
O Cl
It is probable that this substance will be lachrymatory because:
it contains a structural feature associated with this effect; it has a vapour pressure of 7mm Hg at 25°C and will therefore be volatile in ambient conditions.
It is improbable that this substance will be lachrymatory because:
although it contains a structural feature associated with this effect; it has an estimated vapour pressure which is very low and will therefore be involatile in ambient conditions. Figure 1 . Example of the kind of inference and reporting facilities which it is expected to be able to provide. (The details of this example may not be scientifically precise).
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extrapolating from animal results to humans;
• a further factor of 10 when extrapolating from less than chronic results from experimental animals, reflecting the uncertainties inherent in extrapolating from high doses to low doses.
Although these factors reflect uncertainties due to various forms of extrapolation, these uncertainties are compiled into a single cautious estimate of the lower bound of a range of possible values for the RfD. Extrapolations of these kinds can, in fact, vary by many orders of magnitude depending on the models being used (Freedman & Zeisel, 1987) . Consequently, the use of a single number results in a seriously misleading information loss. In addition, policy decisions based on the balancing of a cautious but uncertain risk estimate for one course of action, against a more precisely evaluated risk estimate for another, can be seriously misguided (Nichols & Zeckhauser, 1986) . Scope for further spread in the range of possible values for an estimate of RfD for a chemical is dramatically provided by the Modifying Factor MF. This is a subjective judgement based on professional assessment of the uncertainties present in the study. Its value can be greater than zero, but less than or equal to 10. Thus, depending on the chosen value, the estimate of the RfD can be decreased by a further factor of 10, or increased up to any value one would like (short of infinity!).
The important points to emphasise from this example are that:
• toxicological risk assessments for chemicals may at best cover a very wide range of possible values;
• point value estimates conceal the uncertainties inherent in risk estimates;
• judgements based on the comparison of point values may be quite different from those based on the comparison of ranges of possible values;
• in very many cases the spread of possible values for a given risk assessment may be so great that a numerical risk assessment is completely meaningless.
This last point has been widely discussed in the toxicological risk assessment community, but there has not been much discussion of the use of interval valued risk assessments when the data allows. Our aim is to allow the incorporation of numerical data where available, and to allow a grading of risk characterisation from quantitative through semi-quantitative to qualitative, contingent on the reliability and accuracy of the data available. However, this paper will focus on the use of non-numerical risk assessments which are aimed at expressing qualitative aspects of the state of evidence concerning a potential hazard.
Qualitative terms for risk assessment.
Four different approaches to the definition of terms which characterise the state of evidence concerning a risk estimate will be discussed now. In each case, a summary of their definition will be provided, following by a discussion of their respective strengths and weaknesses.
3.1 IARC Classification System. This is based on the U.S. EPA classification scheme. It uses a small set of terms which are defined to represent the current state of evidence. They take as their basis a classification of the weight of evidence for carcinogenicity into five groups for each of human studies and animal studies. These classifications are summarised here, but are defined precisely in (U.S. EPA, 1986).
For human studies, the classifications are:
Sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity. There is an established causal relationship between the agent and human cancer.
Limited evidence of carcinogenicity. A causal relationship is credible but not established.
Inadequate evidence. Few available data, or data unable to support the hypothesis of a causal relationship.
No data. Self-explanatory.
No evidence. No association was found between exposure and increased incidence of cancer in well-conducted epidemiological studies.
Whilst in the case of animal studies they are:
Sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity. Essentially data are available from well conducted experiments which indicate an increased incidence of malignant tumours, or combined malignant and benign tumours, with a high degree of confidence.
Limited evidence of carcinogenicity. Data which are suggestive, but limited for one of a number of specified reasons.
Inadequate evidence. Data which cannot be interpreted as showing either the presence or absence of a carcinogenic effect.
No evidence. There is no increased incidence of neoplasms in at least two well-designed and well-conducted animal studies in different species.
Data obtained from these classifications are then drawn on to provide an overall categorization of the weight of evidence for human carcinogenicity (again, full definitions can be found in U.S. EPA, 1986): Known Human Carcinogen Sufficient evidence from human (epidemiological) studies. Probable Human Carcinogen Sufficient animal evidence and evidence of human carcinogenicity, or at least limited evidence from human (epidemiological) studies. Possible Human Carcinogen Sufficient animal evidence but inadequate human evidence, or limited evidence from human studies in the absence of sufficient animal evidence.
Not Classifiable
Inadequate animal evidence and inadequate human evidence, but sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity in experimental animals. Noncarcinogenic to Humans Evidence for lack of carcinogenicity.
Note that these uncertainty terms are defined specifically in the context of carcinogenicity risk assessment. Our criticism of them is primarily on this basis. It would be more useful to see a set of terms which were defined at a higher level of abstraction. This would enable their intention to be communicable to a person who was not necessarily familiar with the details of risk assessment in a specific domain. It would also enable their usage to be standardised across a wide range of domains.
3.2
Fox's Symbolic Uncertainty Terms. We will now move back towards the model of argumentation, and look at three sets of terms which have been defined on the basis of patterns of argument. The first set of terms is taken from (Fox, 1986) : P is possible if no conditions that are necessary for P are violated. P is plausible if P is possible, and there is an argument in support of P, or the balance of argument is for P. P is probable if P is possible, and there is at least one item of evidence in favour of P. P is certain if a sufficient condition for P is true. P is believed if it is reported by a credible source, or a reliable device or procedure, or if it is the most probable or plausible of the alternatives. P is likely if the summary of evidence and argument is in favour of P. P is suspected if it is not believed, but there is evidence or argument to support it. P is doubted if not-P is suspected or a competitor of P is suspected. P is assumed if it is asserted in domain knowledge (e.g. by default), or derived by general knowledge, and there is no evidence or argument to the contrary.
The intent was that these terms be used to reason about qualitatively different aspects of uncertainty. Consequently, one is not looking to be able to order these terms on a unidimensional scale. Note also that this particular set is a relatively early piece of work, included to introduce the general approach. In order for these definitions to be made precise, a number of more primitive terms would need to be defined. For example, one needs to know how to assess the "balance of argument" (plausible), the "most probable or plausible" (believed), the "summary of evidence" (likely), and so on. Furthermore, in only one of these terms (doubted) is the assessment of credibility moderated by evidence concerning the contrary of the hypothesis P. Nevertheless, this set of terms has interest because of the rich range of states of evidence which it captures.
3.3 Elvang-Gøransson et al's "logical uncertainty" terms. An alternative set of terms with a precise mathematical characterisation were defined in (ElvangGøransson et al., 1993). These terms take the notion of provability in the Logic of Argumentation, LA (Section 4), as primitive. They then express successively increasing degrees of "acceptability" of the arguments which support the propositions of interest; as one progresses down the list there is a decrease in the tension between arguments for and against, a hypothesis P. A precise characterisation of these terms is quite lengthy, and so is not reproduced here. Full details and a discussion of their properties can be found in (Krause et al., 1994) . The following is intended to give a reasonably intuitive informal description.
P is open
if it is any well-formed formula in the language of the logic (one may be unable to construct any arguments concerning it, however). P is supported if an argument, possibly using inconsistent data, can be constructed for it. P is plausible if a consistent argument can be constructed for it (one may also be able to construct a consistent argument against it). P is probable if a consistent argument can be constructed for it, and no consistent argument can be constructed against it. P is confirmed if it satisfies the conditions of being probable and, in addition, no consistent arguments can be constructed against any of the premises used in its supporting argument. P is certain if it is a tautology of the logic. This means that its validity is not contingent on any data in the knowledge-base.
It should be clear that these terms do allow a unidimensional scaling. They are not so rich in expressiveness as those in the previous section, but they do have a precise definition. However, it is an open question as to whether they have "cognitive validity"; that is, whether the definitions reflect people's intuitive usage of the associated terms. If this is not the case, then they will be open to misinterpretation as a vehicle for communication.
3.4
Terms based on hazard recognition. This final set of terms are predicated on hazard recognition as the basis of any risk assessment (e.g Asante-Duah, 1993); the next section will say a little more about how a hazard might be recognised. These definitions are prompted by the British Trust for Ornithology's (BTO) usage of the terms "proven", "probable" and "possible". These are used as qualifiers for records of breeding activity. Their definition of "probable" breeding activity is: "better evidence than bird recorded in breeding season in possible nesting habitat". The "evidence" includes repeated observation of a pair of birds, observation of collection of nesting material and so on. On the other hand, direct observation of birds feeding fledglings at nest, for example, counts as "proven". These terms have been slightly massaged and extended into the following set for risk assessment. Because of our interest in carcinogenicity risk assessment, these terms have been presented in a specific context. However, they can be quite easily generalised in terms of hazard and risk. The successful use of similar terms in BTO field surveys supports the view that they would have cog-nitive validity, although this needs to be verified. These terms do not have a precise mathematical characterisation. However, they do seem to make useful and accurate qualitative distinctions between states of evidence.
The following points should be noted:
• Although it is not explicit in their definition, the above terms are intended to be mutually exclusive. So, for example, a probable Carcinogen would have no known evidence against it (otherwise it would be improbable or equivocal).
• As with possibility theory (Dubois and Prade, 1988) , the identification of a substance as a possible carcinogen commits one very little. As further evidence becomes available, the assessment may become more committed towards probable, or confirmed. Alternatively, the balance of evidence may swing towards equivocal or improbable. But it is expected that there be some machinery in the implementation of this system which will maintain a notion of consistency with respect to, say, possibility theory. For example, one might expect there to be a formal equivalence between "(necessarily) not Carcinogen" and "not possible Carcinogen". In effect, this would be a constraint on the database which ensured that no substance which contained a potential hazard could have carcinogenic activity categorically ruled out by some alternative data. This seems an appropriately cautious approach.
• Just plain "not Carcinogen" does not quite capture the intended meaning. As hinted above, "necessarily not" might be better.
• The use of the word "confirmed" is preferable to "proven" in order to avoid the suggestion that it might be possible to "scientifically prove" anything.
• A positive distinction is drawn between "open" (no evidence either way is available), and concrete evidence that a substance is not carcinogenic.
• An advantage of using a set of terms along these lines is that they could be related to concepts in use in existing work in reasoning under uncertainty. In particular, if more information is available, one might be able to include some ordinal information about potential risk, or grade the qualifiers with a numerical coefficient. It should be possible to augment this set of terms with, or replace them by, numerical coefficients with a well defined semantics should this be deemed appropriate in a specific context.
A "Logic of Argumentation" and the Argumentation Theorem Prover.
The model of inference which forms the basic engine of the prototype should be introduced, before moving on to a discussion of the demonstration carcinogenicity risk adviser. This will enable a brief explanation of how the terms defined in the previous section can be implemented in a computer program.
This section outlines continuing work to develop a flexible and robust system for reasoning under uncertainty referred to as "argumentation" (Fox et al., 1992) . Central to this model is a Logic of Argumentation, LA. LA is basically the "and, implication" fragment of intuitionistic logic (minimal logic), but with the additional feature that propositions are annotated with a succinct, machine readable representation of the proofs, or arguments, which support their validity. Arguments may then be evaluated using one of a number of "aggregation modules" to provide an overall qualifier for the confidence one may have in the associated proposition. Full details of the syntax, semantics and techniques for aggregation for LA may be found in (Krause et al., 1994) .
It has been mentioned that formulae are labelled with a representation of the arguments which support them. To be more precise, these labels are terms in the typed λ-calculus. A well known (to logicians) result, the Curry-Howard isomorphism, demonstrates an equivalence between natural deduction proofs in minimal logic and terms of the typed λ-calculus (Girard et al., 1989) . Consequently, one can be sure that the λ-terms are a correct representation of the construction of the argument supporting the proposition with which the λ-term is associated. Further details of the development of a theorem prover, the Argumentation Theorem Prover or ATP, which returns the arguments, as λ-terms, concerning a proposition of interest can be found in (Krause et al., 1994) . The essential points to emphasise here are that:
• The theorem prover uses classical negation, rather than the more conventional (for logic programming) 'negation as failure'. This enables arguments to be explicitly constructed both for and against (for the negation of) the propositions of interest.
• Being able simultaneously to argue both for and against a proposition strictly entails a contradiction. Classically, the derivation of a contradiction enables one to conclude anything. This pathological state is controlled by rejecting those arguments which have been constructed using an inconsistent set of premises. That is, the arguments for and against are constructed independently from consistent "sub-theories" of the database (Elvang-Gørans-son et al., 1993).
• The λ-term representation of the argument is machine readable. As well as being automatically constructible using a mechanical theorem prover, the terms can be mechanically read and interpreted for a variety of purposes. For example, it is possible to write a program which will "type" a λ-term in a given context. That is, given an argument as a λ-term, one can generate the proposition for which it is an argument. This is useful, for example, in the generation of the textual explanations for sub-components of an argument in the risk adviser prototype.
A number of quantitative and weak-quantitative maps from sets of arguments to a qualifier representing the confidence in the proposition they support is discussed in (Krause et al., 1994) . For example, given a full set of probability coefficients associated with the axioms used to construct a set of arguments concerning a proposition, one may map to a coefficient corresponding to the "probability of provability" of that proposition. However, the primary focus of this paper is on qualitative methods of risk assessment, and the availability of the explicit argument structures makes possible an implementation of the terms defined in the previous section. For example, with the terms of Section 3.4, if the ATP can construct one or more arguments supporting potential carcinogenic activity, but no arguments against, then the substance under consideration will be classified as a probable Carcinogen. On the other hand, if both arguments for and arguments against carcinogenic activity can be identified, then the substance will be classified as equivocal.
A Demonstration Carcinogenicity Risk Adviser.
A demonstration carcinogenicity risk adviser built using the ATP can now be described. The risk reports generated by this demonstrator use the terms defined in the section 3.4. However, it should be emphasised that this is for illustration only, and there are no grounds for the a priori preference of one set of terms over another. Nor can the possibility be excluded that further work might identify a different and preferable set of terms.
As mentioned in the previous section, the qualitative terms used in the demonstrator are based on the notion of hazard identification as a preliminary stage in the assessment of risk. The hazard identification used here draws heavily on the approach taken in the expert system DEREK, which is used for the qualitative prediction of possible toxic action of chemical compounds (Sanderson & Earnshaw, 1991) . DEREK is able to detect chemical sub-structures within molecules, known as structural alerts, and relate these to a rule-base linking them with likely types of toxicity. In the demonstration, the structural alerts have been taken from a U.S. FDA report identifying sub-structures associated with various forms of carcinogenic activity (U.S. FDA, 1986).
The user of the carcinogenicity risk adviser will present the system with the chemical structure of the compound to be assessed, together with any additional information which may be thought relevant (such as possible exposure routes, or species of animal that will be exposed to the chemical). In DEREK, this information is presented using a graphical interface. In the current version of the demonstrator this information is actually presented as a text string representing the structure, but for clarity the text string has been replaced with the appropriate graphical representation in the following examples.
The database of structural alerts is then searched for matches against the entered structure. If a match is found, the ATP then tries to construct arguments for or against the hazard being manifest in the context under consideration. Having constructed all the relevant arguments, a report is generated on the basis of the available evidence. This report is generated by a relatively simple mapping from the argument structures as λ-terms to natural language text. The user may request further explanation of any of the sub-clauses of the report (using an "explain" query), and additional explanation will be generated from the appropriate sub-structure of the argument. The complete system is implemented in Prolog.
It should be emphasised that the demonstrator uses a very simplified database, and some of the following assessments may be chemically or biologically naive.
In the first example (Figure 2 ), the system has been presented with the structure of a substance which it has recognised as cyclophosphamide, a drug used in chemotherapy which is a known active genotoxin.
The second example (Test333, Figure 3 ) has a very similar structure to cyclophosphamide, but the active part of the structure is sufficiently altered that the system is unable to identify any hazard within the structure. However, the report explicitly reflects the state of ignorance about the potential activity of the compound, with the intent that absence of information should not be interpreted as an indication that the compound is safe.
Test444 (Figure 4 ) is an aromatic azoxy compound. Here the user has provided the additional information that they are concerned about the substance being taken orally. The system has recognised that this substance contains a functional group which can potentially be transformed into hydroxylamine, which is a specific mutagen. Further evidence for activity is supplied by the argument that the substance could be transported to a site within the body where the agent necessary for the transformation of the functional group into hydroxylamine is also present.
In the final example (Test555, Figure 5 ), the user has a specific interest in the possible activity of the substance in Guinea Pigs. In this case, the substance, aniline, is usually associated with carcinogenic activity. However, activation of the substance is very unlikely in this context, as the agents required are not present in Guinea Pigs.
Enter an identifier for the structure you want analysed -Test222.
Enter the structure you want analysed -
Risk Report:
The substance Test222 is a confirmed carcinogen because it is cyclophosphamide which is known to be an active genotoxin Figure 2 . The test substance is identified as a confirmed carcinogen.
Enter an identifier for the structure you want analysed -Test333.
Enter the structure you want analysed -.
We remain open about the potential carcinogenicity of the substance Figure 3 . With Test333, the system reports an "open" verdict because it is unable to identify any information relevant to that specific compound.
Enter an identifier for the structure you want analysed -Test444.
The substance Test444 is a probable carcinogen because it contains the structural alert 103 and 1: 103 is a substructure of Test444 and 2: 103 can be transformed to hydroxylamine and 3: hydroxylamine is a specific mutagen Explain 2. Enter an identifier for the structure you want analysed -Test555.
Enter the structure you want analysedIt is improbable that the substance Test555 will show carcinogenic activity because although it contains the structural alert aromatic amine, activity is unlikely because 1: an aromatic amine is a substructure of Test555 and 2: aromatic amines need hydroxylation to activate their carcinogenic potential and 3: the process hydroxylation is inactive Explain 3. because 1: the subject of the exposure is a guinea pig and 2: h_enzymes need to be present in the subject in order to activate hydroxylation and 3: it is not the case that h_enzymes may be present in guinea pig Explain 3. because this is known to be the case.
NH 2
Exposure subject: Guinea Pig Figure 5 . Test555 is an improbable carcinogen if the exposure subject is a Guinea Pig, as the enzymes required to activate the substance are not present.
Conclusions
This paper has described the preliminary stages of work to develop sound qualitative methods for risk assessment and communication, and their application in the development of a risk adviser for chemical carcinogenicity. The aim is to provide informative risk assessments in those situations where the precision of a numerical risk characterisation would be illusory and seriously misleading. Of course, one would wish to incorporate numerical data where available, to allow a grading of risk characterisation from qualitative through semi-qualitative to quantitative, contingent on the reliability and accuracy of the data available. Ideally the system would generate the most informative report possible, given the information available, together with a clear indication of the reliability of that report and the major sources of uncertainty. There is still a long way to go to achieve this, but the work reported here gives a sound basis from which to reach this goal.
